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Non-­‐Technical	  Summary	  
Good	   policy	   advice,	   in	   addition	   to	   requiring	   sound	   theoretical	   frameworks	   to	   identify	   growth-­‐
enhancing	  fiscal	  reforms,	  also	  needs	  a	  reliable	  evidence	  base.	  Much	  of	  this	  evidence	  base	  has	  tradi-­‐
tionally	  come	  from	  applications	  of	  econometric	  methods	  to	  various	  fiscal	  aggregates.	  However,	  con-­‐
cerns	  have	  recently	  been	  raised	  over	  the	  merits	  of	  this	  type	  of	  evidence	  for	  policy	  reform	  advice	  in	  
practice;	  see,	  for	  example,	  Rodrik	  (2005),	  Hausmann	  et	  al.	  (2008a).	  It	  seems	  therefore	  useful	  to	  ques-­‐
tion	  whether	  business	  perception	  data	   included	   for	   instance	   in	   the	  World	  Bank	  Enterprise	   Surveys	  
(WBES)	  are	  a	  useful	  additional	  source	  of	  information	  to	  guide	  policy	  makers’	  choices.	  These	  surveys	  
contain	   ratings	   of	   various	   factors	   regarded	   as	   ‘obstacles’	   or	   ‘constraints’	   on	   firms'	   growth	   perfor-­‐
mance	   as	   identified	   by	   firm	   owners	   or	  managers.	  With	   firms'	   investment	   decisions	   likely	   to	   be	   an	  
important	  driver	  of	  aggregate	  economic	  growth,	  and	  these	  investment	  decisions	  likely	  to	  be	  affected	  
by	   firms'	   perceptions,	   such	   perception	   indicators	   could	   potentially	   be	   a	   valuable	   source	   of	   infor-­‐
mation	   on	   actual	   growth	   constraints.	   Indeed,	   a	   number	   of	   authors	   have	   recently	   argued	   over	   the	  
merits	  of	  such	  business	  survey	  information	  as	  a	  reliable	  identifier	  of	  actual	  constraints,	  and	  the	  policy	  
reforms	  that	  might	  follow.	  
The	  objective	  of	  this	  paper	  is	  to	  examine	  whether,	  and	  when,	  subjective	  perceptions	  of	  firms	  may	  be	  
a	  useful	  source	  of	  information	  to	  help	  identify	  growth-­‐enhancing	  fiscal	  reforms.	  Specifically,	  adopting	  
the	  standard	  theoretical	  framework	  for	  the	  analysis	  of	  fiscal	  policy	  and	  long-­‐run	  growth,	  we	  demon-­‐
strate	  that	  firms'	  perceptions	  can	  be	  expected	  to	  suffer	  from	  particular	  biases.	  We	  show	  that	  while	  
these	  biases	  can	  be	  expected	  to	  be	  important	  for	  some	  fiscal	  policy	  reform	  options,	  they	  are	  not	  for	  
others.	  This	  suggests	  that	   it	   is	   important	  to	  distinguish	  between	  the	  specific	  contexts	   in	  which	  such	  
business	  perception	  information	  is	  likely	  to	  offer	  reliable	  or	  unreliable	  guidance	  to	  growth-­‐enhancing	  
policy	  reforms.	  The	  essence	  of	  our	  argument	  is	  that,	  in	  part	  because	  of	  the	  way	  business	  survey	  ques-­‐
tions	  are	  constructed,	  firms’	  responses	  can	  be	  expected	  to	  focus	  on	  the	  direct	  effects	  of	  policies	  alle-­‐
viating	  particular	  constraints	   that	   they	  see	  as	  obstacles,	  while	   ignoring	  the	  externalities,	  or	   indirect	  
effects	  of	  these	  policies.	  We	  exploit	  this	  assumption	  to	  model	  firm	  perceptions	  of	  fiscal	  policy-­‐related	  
constraints	   including	   taxation	   and	   public	   expenditures	   taking	   two	   different	   forms:	   flows	   of	   public	  
services	  and	  stocks	  of	  public	  capital.	  	  
The	  paper	  makes	  two	  contributions.	  The	  first	  is	  to	  evaluate,	  based	  on	  a	  class	  of	  endogenous	  growth	  
models,	  whether	   business	   perception	   data	   could	   be	   useful	   in	   identifying	   the	   optimal	   direction	   for	  
fiscal	  policy	  reform.	  We	  show	  that,	  regardless	  of	  model	  parameters,	  it	  is	  likely	  that	  firms	  perceive	  the	  
(distortionary)	  tax	  rate	  as	  a	  more	  severe	  constraint	  than	  public	  service-­‐related	  constraints,	  which	  in	  
turn	  are	  likely	  to	  be	  perceived	  as	  more	  severe	  than	  public	  capital-­‐related	  constraints.	  Firms	  view	  fis-­‐
cal	   constraints	   in	   this	   order	   even	   when	   taxes	   and	   spending	   are	   set	   at	   their	   optimal,	   growth-­‐
maximizing	  values	  (i.e.	  where	  changes	  to	  any	  fiscal	  parameters	  would	  result	  in	  declines	  of	  the	  growth	  
rate).	  However,	  this	  framework	  also	  predicts	  that	  for	  comparisons	  of	  fiscal	  constraints	  involving	  simi-­‐
lar	   types	  of	  public	   spending	   (e.g.	  between	  two	  public	   service-­‐related,	  or	   two	  public	  capital-­‐related,	  
spending	   categories),	   business	   perception	   data	   do	   not	   suffer	   from	   such	   systematic	   biases	   vis-­‐à-­‐vis	  
optimal	  policy	  responses.	  
The	  second	  contribution	  is	  to	  compare	  actual	  business	  perception	  data	  from	  the	  World	  Bank	  Enter-­‐
prise	  Surveys,	  and	  in	  particular	  how	  firms	  rank	  fiscal	  policy-­‐related	  constraints,	  with	  the	  ranking	  pre-­‐
dicted	  by	  the	  endogenous	  fiscal-­‐growth	  framework.	  We	  find	  that	  the	  WBES	  rankings	  of	  fiscal	  policy-­‐
related	  constraints	  closely	  match	  those	  predicted	  by	  the	  theoretical	  models.	  
	  Das	  Wichtigste	  in	  Kürze	  
Politikempfehlungen	   zur	   Förderung	   von	   Wirtschaftswachstum	   basieren	   idealerweise	   auf	   theoreti-­‐
schen	  Modellen	  und	  auf	  empirischer	  Evidenz.	  Letztere	  ist	  traditionell	  das	  Ergebnis	  statistischer	  Aus-­‐
wertungen	   von	   aggregierten	   fiskalpolitischen	   Daten	  mittels	   Regressionen.	   In	   der	   Literatur	   werden	  
Politikempfehlungen,	   die	   auf	   dieser	   Art	   von	   empirischer	   Evidenz	   basieren,	   allerdings	   zunehmend	  
kritisiert,	  siehe	  z.B.	  Rodrik	  (2005)	  und	  Hausmann	  et	  al.	  (2008a).	  Daher	  ist	  es	  wichtig	  zu	  evaluieren,	  ob	  
Perzeptionen	  von	  Unternehmen,	  die	  beispielsweise	  im	  Rahmen	  von	  den	  Weltbank	  Enterprise	  Surveys	  
(WBES)	   erhoben	   werden,	   möglicherweise	   eine	   zusätzliche	   Informationsquelle	   für	   fiskalpolitische	  
Entscheidungen	   von	   Regierungen	   darstellen.	   In	   diesen	   Befragungen	   bewerten	   Eigentümern	   bzw.	  
Manager	  verschiedene	  Faktoren,	  die	  möglicherweise	  die	  Performance	  von	  Unternehmen	  beeinträch-­‐
tigen.	  Da	   Investitionsentscheidungen	  von	  Unternehmen	   zentral	   für	  makroökonomisches	  Wachstum	  
sind	  und	  möglicherweise	  von	  den	  Perzeptionen	  der	  Unternehmen	  beeinflusst	  werden,	  sind	  perzepti-­‐
ons-­‐basierte	  Indikatoren	  potentiell	  eine	  wichtige	  Informationsquelle	  für	  tatsächliche	  Wachstumshin-­‐
dernisse.	  Mehrere	  Studien	  haben	  in	  jüngster	  Vergangenheit	  den	  Wert	  von	  Unternehmensperzeptio-­‐
nen	  für	  wirtschaftspolitische	  Reformen	  untersucht.	  
Das	  Ziel	  dieser	  Studie	  besteht	  darin	  zu	  bewerten,	  ob	  und	  wann	  subjektive	  Perzeptionen	  von	  Unter-­‐
nehmen	  helfen	  können,	  spezifische	  wachstumsfördernde	  fiskalpolitische	  Reformen	  zu	  identifizieren.	  
Mit	  Hilfe	  eines	  oft	  benutzten	   theoretischen	  Modells	   für	  die	  Analyse	  von	  Fiskalpolitik	  und	   langfristi-­‐
gem	  Wachstum	  zeigen	  wir,	  dass	  Unternehmensperzeptionen	  verzerrt	  sind.	  Diese	  Verzerrungen	  spie-­‐
len	   eine	   große	   Rolle	   bei	   der	   Bewertung	   einiger,	   aber	   nicht	   aller,	   fiskalpolitischer	   Reformoptionen.	  
Dies	   impliziert,	   dass	  es	  wichtig	   ist,	   Fälle,	   in	  denen	  Unternehmensperzeptionen	  eine	   verlässliche	   In-­‐
formationsquelle	  darstellen,	  von	  anderen	  Fällen	  zu	  unterscheiden.	  Der	  Kern	  unseres	  Arguments	  be-­‐
steht	  darin,	  dass	  Unternehmen	  vor	  allem	  die	  direkten	  Effekte	  bewerten,	  die	  aus	  der	  Beseitigung	  be-­‐
stimmter	   wachstumshemmender	   Faktoren	   entstehen,	   aber	   gleichzeitig	   auftretende	   Externalitäten	  
weitgehend	   ignorieren.	   Diese	   Modellannahme	   benutzen	   wir,	   um	   Unternehmensperzeptionen	   von	  
mit	   Fiskalpolitik	   in	   Verbindung	   stehenden	   Wachstumshemmnissen	   modelltheoretisch	   abzubilden.	  
Wir	  untersuchen	  Steuern,	  öffentliche	  Dienstleistungen	  und	  den	  öffentlichen	  Kapitalstock	  in	  unserem	  
Modell.	  	  
Diese	  Studie	  zeigt	  erstens,	  dass	  Unternehmen	  unabhängig	  von	  Modellparametern	  verzerrende	  Steu-­‐
ern	  als	  das	  größte	  Wachstumshindernis	   sehen.	  Öffentliche	  Dienstleistungen	  werden	  von	  Unterneh-­‐
men	  meist	   als	   größeres	  Wachstumshindernis	   gesehen	   als	  Wachstumshindernisse,	   die	  mit	   dem	   öf-­‐
fentlichen	  Kapitalstock	   zusammenhängen.	  Diese	  Reihenfolge	   in	  der	  Bewertung	  von	  Wachstumshin-­‐
dernissen	  ergibt	  sich	  auch,	  wenn	  die	  Höhe	  von	  Steuern	  und	  Ausgaben	  optimal,	  d.h.	  wachstumsma-­‐
ximierend,	  ist.	  Gleichzeitig	  zeigen	  wir	  jedoch,	  dass	  Unternehmen	  die	  relative	  Wichtigkeit	  von	  gleich-­‐
artigen	  Wachstumshindernissen	  (z.B.	  unterschiedliche	  Arten	  von	  öffentlichen	  Dienstleistungen)	  kor-­‐
rekt	  einschätzen	  können.	  Schließlich	  vergleichen	  wir	  die	  WBES-­‐Daten	  mit	  den	  Vorhersagen	  unseres	  
Modells.	  Wir	  zeigen,	  dass	  die	  beobachteten	  WBES-­‐Rankings	  mit	  unserem	  Modell	  konsistent	  sind.	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1 Introduction
The seminal contributions of Barro (1990) and Devarajan et al. (1996) pro-
vided the foundation for what has become a standardtheoretical framework
to analyze the impact of scal policy on long-run growth. Broadly, this in-
volves modelling the distortionary e¤ects of taxation via impacts on the pri-
vate marginal product of capital, and the productivity-enhancing e¤ects of
di¤erent types of public spending.1 Such models capture scal externalities
in the form of private rm-level productivity e¤ects from public spending
and the deadweight costs of taxation. While such frameworks are helpful for
thinking at a fairly high level about potential growth e¤ects of scal policy,
in practice, they provide only limited guidance to policy advisers seeking
to identify which particular scal reforms (changes in individual tax rates
or changes to specic categories of public spending for example) are likely
to be growth-enhancing or have the smallest/largest impact. Recently a re-
lated but largely separate strand of research has begun to focus on specic
policy-based and other constraints on growth; see, for example, Dixit (2007)
and Hausmann et al. (2008b) and Rodrik (2010). This conceptual growth
diagnosticapproach focuses on identifying the most binding constraints on
growth in practice and thereby goes beyond the more abstract predictions
and policy implications of highly stylized conceptual models.2 However, good
policy advice, in addition to requiring sound theoretical frameworks to iden-
tify growth-enhancing scal reforms, also needs a reliable evidence base. The
objective of this paper is therefore to examine whether, and when, subjective
perceptions of rms may be a useful source of information to help identify
growth-enhancing scal reforms.
Much of the evidence base for policy advice to promote growth has tra-
ditionally come from applications of econometric methods to various scal
aggregates. However, concerns have recently been raised over the merits of
1For recent contributions see, for example, Turnovsky (2004), Semmler et al. (2007),
Agénor (2008a), Agénor (2008b), Monteiro and Turnovsky (2008).
2This strand of the literature argues that removing the most binding constraint of an
economy has the largest growth e¤ects; Misch et al. (2010) show that this proposition is
indeed optimal under certain conditions in a more formal growth framework.
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this type of evidence for policy reform advice in practice; see, for example,
Carlin et al. (2010), Rodrik (2005), Hausmann et al. (2008a). It seems there-
fore useful to question whether business perceptions, such as those provided
by the World Bank (World Bank Enterprise Surveys, WBES), are a useful
additional source of information to guide policy makerschoices. These sur-
veys contain ratings of various factors regarded as obstaclesor constraints
on rmsgrowth performance as identied by rm owners or managers. With
rmsinvestment decisions likely to be an important driver of aggregate eco-
nomic growth, and these investment decisions likely to be a¤ected by rms
perceptions, such perception indicators could potentially be a valuable source
of information on actual growth constraints. Recognizing the potential value
of these data does not imply however that we would want to take a view that
these data always provide useful information to policy makers, although
equally we do not want to take the view that they should never be used.
This type of balancedview must be based on a framework through which
to interpret these data. Indeed, a number of authors have recently argued
over the merits of such business survey information as a reliable identier
of actual constraints, and the policy reforms that might follow.3 Hallward-
Driemeier and Aterido (2009) nd that the ratings of a range of obstacles by
rms correlate positively with objective measures of the same constraint; by
contrast, Clarke (2010) nds that the rating of specic obstacles is a¤ected
by the managersoverall business condence undermining the potential value
for policy of business perceptions. Based on a static model where production
requires private and public inputs, Carlin et al. (2007, 2010) mainly examine
the ratings of the same constraint by di¤erent rms in di¤erent countries and
show that ratings of public good-related obstacles are negatively correlated
with country-level income and positively correlated with rm-level perfor-
mance. By contrast, we take a di¤erent approach and adopt the standard
theoretical framework for the analysis of scal policy and long-run growth of
both the aggregate economy and a representative rm dating back to Barro
3Hausmann et al. (2008a) provide an overview of the general principles needed to iden-
tify the most binding constraint on the economy using di¤erent sources of data including
business perceptions. They suggest that careful use of such perception data is potentially
helpful.
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(1990) and demonstrate that rmsperceptions, in particular the ranking
of di¤erent scal policy-related constraints by the same rm, can be ex-
pected to su¤er from particular biases. While this framework is based on a
restrictive set of assumptions, we nevertheless argue that it is particularly
well suited to model and assess rmsperceptions of growth constraints, in
part due to its simplicity and the resulting clarity of the analysis. We show
that these biases can be expected to be important for the evaluation of some
scal policy reform options, but not for others. This suggests that it is im-
portant to distinguish between the specic contexts in which such business
perception information is likely to o¤er reliable or unreliable guidance to
growth-enhancing policy reforms.
The essence of our argument is that, in part because of the way business
survey questions are constructed, rmsresponses can be expected to focus
on the direct e¤ects of policies alleviating particular constraints that they
see as obstacles, while ignoring the externalities, or indirect e¤ects of these
policies. Endogenous growth models with public nance involve a direct the-
oretical counterpart to this: private agents ignore the externalities that arise
via the government budget constraint. For instance, they ignore positive ex-
ternalities from private investment in the sense that increasing output raises
public revenue which in turn gives rise to higher productive public spending.
We exploit this assumption to model rm perceptions of scal policy-related
constraints including taxation and public expenditures taking two di¤erent
forms: ows of public services and stocks of public capital.
The paper makes two contributions. The rst is to evaluate, based on a
class of endogenous growth models, whether business perception data could
be useful in identifying the optimal direction for scal policy reform. We
show that it is likely that rms perceive the (distortionary) tax rate as a more
severe constraint than public service-related constraints, which in turn are
likely to be perceived as more severe than public capital-related constraints.
Firms view scal constraints in this order even when taxes and spending are
set at their optimal, growth-maximizing values (i.e., where changes to any
scal parameters would result in declines of the growth rate). However, this
framework also predicts that for comparisons of scal constraints involving
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similar types of public spending (between two public service-related, or two
public capital-related, spending categories for example), business perception
data do not su¤er from such systematic biases vis-à-vis optimal policy re-
sponses. Therefore, the perceived ranking of constraints may or may not be
correlated with the actual severity of constraints. We show that our conclu-
sions hold for a variety of model parameters such as those that determine
the rmsreliance on public services and public capital; we thereby take into
account that rms are heterogenous.
The second contribution is to compare actual business perception data
from theWorld Bank Enterprise Surveys, and in particular how rms rank s-
cal policy-related constraints, with the ranking predicted by the endogenous
scal-growth framework. The WBES, covering a wide range of businesses in
many countries, provides comprehensive information on how rms rate alter-
native scal instruments in terms of the severity of the constraints imposed
on their (growth) performance. We nd that the WBES rankings of scal
policy-related constraints closely match those predicted by the theoretical
models and therefore appear to mirror these biases. While based on the data
we cannot rule out that the observed WBES ranking may in fact reect the
actual severity of constraints, we nevertheless argue that in the absence of the
biases we identify in the model, such an average ranking would be unlikely
to arise across a large number of rms.
The paper is organized as follows. Sections 2 and 3 develop the models,
derive the equilibrium of the market economy, and identify the rst-best
growth-maximizing policies. Section 4 models business perceptions, assesses
their merits for policy making, and derives theoretical predictions regarding
rmsranking of scal policy-related constraints. Section 5 tests the latter
against the ranking of constraints by rms in the WBES. Section 6 concludes.
2 The Modelling Framework
The public nance growth framework we adopt in the paper is an extension
of the well known model developed by Devarajan et al. (1996). We assume
that there is a large number of innitely lived households and a large number
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of rms that are both normalized to one, that population growth is zero, and
that there is no entry or exit of rms.
Given that we are not analyzing interactions between rms and focus on
the ranking of di¤erent constraints by the same rm in subsequent sections,
we only consider a single representative rm. However, by considering the
robustness of the results under a variety of technology parameters, we account
for the fact that rms are heterogeneous. The representative rm produces
a single composite good using private capital (k) which is broadly dened to
encompass physical and human capital, and two public inputs, G1 and G2,
based on Cobb-Douglas technology:
y = kG11 G
2
2 (1)
where  = 1   1   2. The productivity of private capital used by the
individual rm therefore positively depends on G1 and G2 which are provided
free of charge by the government at the point of consumption. For instance,
private vehicles can be used more productively when the quality of the road
network increases.4
G1 and G2 are delivered via two di¤erent productive public spending
categories, g1 and g2, and the government nances total public expenditure,
g1 + g2, by levying a at tax,  , on income. Thus the government budget,
which is assumed always to be balanced, is:
g1 + g2 = y (2)
Let 1 and 2 denote the share of the budget that is allocated to g1 and g2
so that
g1 = 1y (3)
g2 = 2y (4)
with 1 + 2 = 1.
4Obviously, most public services and types of public capital are subject to congestion
which reduces the amount available to the individual rm. Given that modelling conges-
tion complicates the analysis considerably and may prevent long-run growth from arising,
we implicitly assume for simplicity, that G1 and G2 are non-rival and non-excludable.
However, our results would continue to hold with some congestion e¤ects.
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The households own the rms and therefore receive all their output net
of taxation which they either reinvest in the rms to increase their capital
stock or which they use for consumption depending on their preferences and
the returns on private capital.5 Investment by the representative household
can therefore be written as
_k = (1  )y   c (5)
The instantaneous utility function of the household is
u(c) =
c1 
1   (6)
We develop three versions of the model to understand the robustness
of the key result of the ranking of various scal policy constraints. These
accord with di¤erent views about whether the productive public inputs (G1
and G2) are stocks or ows. In particular, there has been some debate in
the literature regarding whether private output is likely to be a¤ected by the
ow of public services (miles of highway constructed per year for example) or
the stock of public capital (total miles of highway in existence).6 In Model
1, which coincides with the Devarajan et a. (1996) model,
G1;2 = g1;2 = 1;2y (7)
implying that G1 and G2 are two di¤erent productive public services which
are derived from the ow of public expenditure.
In the second version of the model referred to as Model 2, G1 denotes
public services as above so that
G1 = g1 = 1y (8)
whereas G2 denotes the stock of public capital implying that g2 represents
public investment:
_G2 = g2 = 2y (9)
5Alternatively, we could assume that rms and households are one entity commonly
referred to as household producers in the literature.
6See for example Barro (1990) and Futagami et al. (1993).
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Table 1: Model summary
Model G1 G2
1 public service public service
2 public service public capital
3 public capital public capital
This version corresponds to the model developed in Tsoukis and Miller (2003)
for example.
In the third version of the model referred to as Model 3, G1 and G2
represent two di¤erent types of public capital so that
_G1;2 = g2 = 1;2y (10)
As shown below, all results derived for Model 1 equally apply to Model 3.
Table 1 includes a summary of the key features of the models described above.
Alternatively, we could develop one model with two types of public services
and two types of public capital that would allow us to gain exactly the same
insights compared to the use of three models. However, while this model
would be more realistic, the presentation would be also harder to follow, and
there would be no immediate benets.
The assumption of Cobb-Douglas technology is convenient because it al-
lows for closed-form solutions of optimal policies as shown below, but ar-
guably, it may not be very realistic. In particular, factors of production may
be complements, in part because public inputs provided by the government
fundamentally di¤er from private inputs, such that it may be very costly
for rms to substitute for them. For example, poor performance of public
law enforcement may require rms to install costly security and property
protection systems. Therefore, in the Appendix, we show that the results
also hold for the more general case of CES technology when the elasticity of
substitution is smaller than one.
The representative household maximizes lifetime utility U given by
U =
Z 1
0
u(c(t))e tdt (11)
subject to the respective production function of the model as well as the
households resource constraint given by (5) taking the initial capital stock
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k0 > 0 as well as  , G1 and G2 as given.7 The latter assumption, namely
that private agents take all aspects of scal policy as given, is crucial for
the remainder of the paper and directly follows from the fact that the model
economy is populated by a large number of rms and households. From the
rst-order conditions, the growth rate of the households consumption and
of the economy can be written in familiar form as
 =
_c
c
=
1

((1  )yk   ) (12)
The representative household computes the marginal product of private
capital (which represents the returns on private capital) from (1) while hold-
ing constant the quantity of public inputs to private production that the
representative rm it owns receives. Here we are assuming that when there
are a large number of tax-paying rms, the impact of raising the stock of the
private capital and output of an individual rm on the level of total public
spending is likely very small and can therefore safely be ignored. Hence, the
marginal product of private capital is
yk = 

G1
k
1 G2
k
2
(13)
so that from (12), the growth rate can be written as
 =
1


(1  )

G1
k
1 G2
k
2
  

(14)
In order to ensure that the transversality condition holds and does not con-
strain the choice of  and 1;2, it is assumed that  > 1.
8 In Model 1, there
are no transitional dynamics, and the economy is always on the balanced
growth path. The Appendix shows that the equilibrium of Models 2 and 3 is
saddlepoint stable within relevant parameter ranges, and that the balanced
growth path is unique. Along the balanced growth path, c, k, G1, G2 and y
all grow at the same rate. Obviously, in this class of models, long-run growth
7The time subscript is omitted whenever possible. A dot over the variable denotes its
derivative with respect to time. In Models 2 and 3, the initial stock of public capital must
also be greater than zero.
8The transversality condition can be written as lim
t!1[k] = 0 where  is the costate
variable of the current-value Hamiltonian.
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at the aggregate level is a result of the nature of the rmsproduction func-
tion: the rmsoutput grows in the long-run due to constant returns to scale
in private capital and public inputs which expand in parallel to the rms
capital stock. The growth rate of the representative rm, _y
y
, in turn corre-
sponds to (12) and depends on the net return to private capital, (1   )yk,
and on the owners (i.e. the households) preferences represented by  and
.
3 Optimal Fiscal Policy
This section derives the growth-maximizing tax rate,  , and the growth-
maximizing share of public resources allocated to each public input to pri-
vate production (G1;2), 

1;2. These growth-maximizing policies provide the
benchmark against which business perceptions of policy are then compared
below. For simplicity, we assume that the objective of the government is to
maximize growth. We recognize that growth- and welfare-maximizing poli-
cies may di¤er in these models, although di¤erences in outcomes are often
relatively small as shown by Misch et al. (forthcoming). Firms only consider
growth outcomes; for that reason we leave the consideration of welfare maxi-
mization to future analysis. In order to nd the growth-maximizing policies,
G1;2
k
must be expressed in terms of the scal policy parameters in each model
version.
Model 1 (two public services)
Using (7) to substitute for G1;2 in (1) and rearranging yields
y
k
= 
1+2
 
1

1 
2

2 (15)
so that G1
k
and G2
k
can be written as
G1
k
= 
1

1 2

1 
2

2 (16)
G2
k
= 
1

1

1 
1 1

2 (17)
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Using (16) and (17), the growth rate given by (14) can be re-written as
 =
1

((1  ) 1+2 
1

1 
2

2   ) (18)
Maximizing (18) with regard to  and 1 and taking into account that 2 =
1   1 yields the growth-maximizing tax rate,  , the growth-maximizing
share of public resources allocated to G1, 

1, and the growth-maximizing
share of public resources allocated to G2, (1  1):
  = 1 + 2 (19)
1 =
1
1 + 2
(20)
2 =
2
1 + 2
(21)
Model 2 (public services and public capital stock)
Using the condition along the balanced growth path:
y = _y= (22)
to substitute for y in (9), and integrating, yields
G2 =
2

y (23)
Further, using (8) and (23) to substitute for G1 and G2, respectively, in (1),
and rearranging yields:
y
k
= 
1+2
 
1

1

2

2

(24)
Finally, using (24), (22), and (23) in combination with (14), it can then be
shown that the growth rate in Model 2 has to satisfy the following equation:
 =
1


(1  ) 1+2 
1

1

2

2
   

(25)
which di¤ers from Model 1 because  appears on the RHS. However, using
implicit di¤erentiation, it can be shown that the growth-maximizing tax rate
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and the growth-maximizing spending share of G1,   and 

1, respectively,
are identical to Model 1 when Cobb-Douglas technology is assumed.
Model 3 (two public capital stocks)
In Model 3, G1 and G2 denote the stock of two di¤erent types of public
capital and can be expressed by analogy to (23) as:
Gi =
i

y (26)
such that the growth rate satises the following equation:
 =
1

 
(1  )  1+2

1

1


2

2

  
!
(27)
The growth-maximizing policies can then be derived in a similar manner to
Model 2. With Cobb-Douglas technology, they are also identical to Model 1.
In all models,   and 1;2 can be considered as optimal policies in a situa-
tion where the government is unconstrained and maximizes growth. However,
governments are typically constrained in their ability to change various el-
ements of scal policy due to legal requirements or commitments such as
interest payments that depend on previous accumulated public debt, which
generate budget rigidities. More importantly, governments are inevitably
imperfectly informed about the production technology parameters required
to set  and 1;2 to their rst-best values. Rather, governments generally
face the challenge of identifying growth-enhancing policy changes or reforms
that take existing policy as its starting point. The next section considers
how far business (rms) assessments of scal policy-related constraints to
growth can be expected to serve as a reliable guide to identify the direction
of scal policy parameter changes that enhance growth.
4 FirmsPerceptions of Constraints: Theo-
retical Predictions
4.1 Modelling Business Perceptions
This sub-section models business perceptions of scal policy-related con-
straints to growth, and in particular the ratings of obstacles provided by
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rms in the Enterprise Surveys. This will allow us to assess whether the
scal policy adjustments they suggest raise or lower the long-run growth rate
and thereby align with the rst-best policy option chosen by a perfectly in-
formed government that maximizes the growth rate. As part of the Enterprise
Surveys, business owners or top managers are typically asked: Please tell
us if any of the following issues are a problem for the operation and growth
of your business. If an issue poses a problem, please judge its severity as an
obstacle on a four-point scale.9 The list of obstacles that rms are presented
includes tax rates, various types of obstacles that relate to publicly provided
services and one obstacle that relates to public capital.
We model the rmsperceptions of these types of constraints, namely the
tax rate, public services and public capital, as equivalent to the rmsexpec-
tations about the impact of relaxing constraints on their growth rate. In our
model, these constraints correspond to  , and G1 as well as G2, which, de-
pending on the model version, either represent public services and/or public
capital. Note that these constraints are not equivalent to the policy parame-
ters that the government can set, namely  , 1 and 2.
The business perceptions of the severity of these constraints are poten-
tially biased if the central assumption we make holds, namely that business
respondents do not internalize the government budget constraint when they
are asked to rate scal policy-related constraints. This assumption follows
directly from the positive investment externality described above and thereby
ensures consistency because rms are also assumed to ignore these external-
ities when they computethe returns on their investment. This assumption
is further justied in the presence of a large number of rms: individual
rms are unlikely to internalize the positive externalities of private invest-
ment, where the latter arise because higher levels of private output result
in higher public revenue, which in turn enables higher levels of productive
public spending and thereby higher returns to all rmsprivate capital. Fi-
nally, since the way the survey question is framed makes no provision for the
existence or the relevance of the government budget constraint, it might be
9This is the question asked in the standard survey design. The question may slightly
di¤er for surveys in some countries.
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expected to encourage rms to ignore the government budget constraint in
the context of the survey.10
The rating of the severity of obstacles implies that rms take the public
inputs to private production, G1 and G2, as given. While rms could in
principle rate the severity of the constraints in terms of increases in current
output, lifetime utility, or the growth rate, that result from their alleviation,
we choose the latter as this is the measure implied by the question asked in
the Enterprise Surveys.11 A natural way to model the answers of the rms in
the Enterprise Surveys is therefore to consider the growth e¤ects of relaxing
the constraints. We model this as the change in the growth rate that the
representative rm expects as a result of raising G1 and G2 and lowering  .
We therefore use the derivatives of the growth rate with respect to G1, G2
and  (denoted by B1 , 
B
2 , and 
B
 , respectively) as simple measures of the
rmsrating of the severity of the constraints; hence:12
B1;2 =
@
@G1;2
(28)
B =  
@
@
(29)
where, based on our assumptions, rms perceive the growth rate, B, as:
B =
1


(1  )

G1
k
1 G2
k
2
  

(30)
which corresponds to (14).
10Though this assumption seems reasonable in the context of responses to business
surveys questions, the political economy literature assessing individualsor votersscal
policy preferences has egun to examine the case where they recognize the government
budget constraint; see, for example, Creedy (2008).
11The di¤erent measures can yield di¤erent results, especially where the models imply
that growth- and welfare-maximizing policies di¤er. In Model 1, for example, the growth-
and welfare-maximizing scal policies coincide under Cobb-Douglas technology because
public capital is not included (see Futagami, Morita and Shibata (1993) for comparison).
12When we compute the partial derivatives, we implicitely ignore the subsequent change
in the capital stock that is a consequence of the second-order response to a change in the
change of the capital stock (i.e. a change in the rate of investment). These e¤ects are
likely to be small and qualitatively unimportant for our results.
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4.2 Assessing Business Perceptions
Business perceptions of constraints can be assessed by evaluating the pre-
ferred scal policies they imply. If, for instance, B1 > 0, then business
perceptions imply that increasing 1 or  , in order to raise G1, has a positive
e¤ect on the growth rate. Note that B is dened above as the negative of
@B
@
, such that if B > 0, businesses perceive that lowering  has a positive
e¤ect on the growth rate. Clearly then, business perceptions will suggest
the direction of the appropriate policy response, but will not indicate the
magnitude of the change necessary to reach the growth-maximizing point.
While this is a limitation of the information that can be gained from business
perception data compared to that found from calculating where the growth-
maximizing point lies, in practice, budget rigidities and other information
limitations often mean that scal policy adjustments require recognizing the
correct direction, rather than end-point, of reform.
When all scal policy parameters are set at their growth-maximizing lev-
els then, in the absence of any systematic bias, rms should perceive none
of the constraints as binding, that is: B1;2 = 0 and 
B
 = 0. However, it
is obvious from equation (30) that rms always perceive that B1;2 > 0 and
B > 0 so that the policy suggestions arising from business perceptions may
conict with correctrst-best policy advice. Other things equal, rms al-
ways want more spending on productive public inputs and lower taxation.13
The truee¤ects of changing 1;2 or  obviously depend on whether their
current values are at, below, or above their growth-maximizing values, 1;2
and  . The source of this systematic bias of business perceptions relates to
our assumption that rms ignore the government budget constraint: rms
do not consider the negative e¤ects (positive e¤ects) of lowering taxes in
terms of lower productive public spending (or increasing spending on public
services and public capital in terms of higher taxation). From the models,
this is not surprising, given that the expression for the perceived growth
rate (30) di¤ers from the growth rates in the three models considered as
13The only exception is of course the unrealisitc case when  = 0 so that  = 0 or
when G1 and G2 are so large so that B1;2  0. Alternatively, B1;2  0 when 1 and 2
are very small.
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assessed by a perfectly informed government - in (18), (25) and (27). By
contrast, a fully informed government essentially assesses the severity of con-
straints associated with scal policy by computing the rst derivatives of
(18), (25) and (27), depending on the model, with respect to  , 1 and 2.
Where policy parameters are already set at their growth-maximizing levels,
a fully informed government would not perceive them as binding, so that
@=@1;2 = @=@ = 0.
Comparing the optimal, i.e. rst-best policy choices, with those suggested
by business perceptions is in essence an analogy to comparisons between in-
vestment decisions taken by a central planner and by private agents in a
decentralized economy. In both cases, di¤erences arise because of positive in-
vestment externalities that are ignored by private agents: private investment
raises the stock of private capital resulting in higher output and therefore
higher public revenue. Given that the government budget is always assumed
to be balanced, increased public revenue leads to higher levels of productive
public expenditure which in turn increases private productivity. Ignoring
this externality obviously distorts private investment.
We now attempt to correct business perceptions for this bias: instead of
considering business perceptions in absolute terms, the policy implications of
business perceptions are instead evaluated in relative terms; i.e. we compare
perceptions of di¤erent obstacles, by the same rm. If constraint i is per-
ceived as more binding than constraint j (so that 
B
i
Bj
> 1 with i; j = 1; 2; 
and i 6= j), the policy implication is that removing constraint i raises the
growth rate whereas alleviating constraint j enhances the growth rate less
or may even lower the growth rate. The underlying rationale is that this
may cancel outthe systematic bias due to ignoring the government budget
constraint inherent in the perception of all obstacles. In particular, ignor-
ing the government budget constraint essentially implies that rms ignore
the indirect e¤ects of alleviating scal policy constraints. In principle, if the
indirect e¤ects are approximately similar or are alternatively negatively cor-
related with the direct growth e¤ects that result from alleviating constraints
and that rms perceive (so that the observed direct e¤ects are su¢ cient to
determine the ranking of the constraints), this is a useful strategy. However,
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we show in subsequent sub-sections that while our strategy to correct for the
bias of business perceptions proves successful for similar types of constraints,
some systematic bias may remain when di¤erent types of constraints are
compared.
4.3 FirmsComparisons of Di¤erent Types of Public
Services or of Public Capital
We rst turn to successful cases and evaluate the policy implications of
business perceptions of similar public spending-related constraints in relation
to each other in Model 1 (two di¤erent public services) and in Model 3 (two
di¤erent types of public capital). From (28), 
B
1
B2
can be written as
B1
B2
=
G21
G12
(31)
A comparison of the perceptions of two types public services or two types of
public capital eliminates the potential bias inherent in subjective rm data
due to the rms ignoring the government budget constraint. To show this,
we use (7) for the case of two public services (Model 1) and (26) for the case
of two types of public capital (Model 2) to re-write (31) as
B1
B2
=
1(1  1)
21
(32)
For the case where spending shares are set at the growth maximum (1 = 

1),
it can be shown that:
B1
B2
= 1 (33)
That is, rms perceive both constraints as equally binding when the alloca-
tion is growth-maximizing in Models 1 and 3. If, on the other hand, 1 < 

1,
then 
B
1
B2
> 1 which suggests that G1 is a greater constraint than G2 (or vice
versa). The conclusion from business perceptions would be to increase 1
which is obviously growth-enhancing, irrespective of the parameter values of
the model. In this case, rm perceptions always align with that which would
be suggested by a fully-informed government and therefore business percep-
tions are of value in this regard and the perceived ranking is correlated with
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the actual ranking of growth constraints. Here, the strategy to eliminate the
bias inherent in business perceptions by considering them in relative terms
is hence successful. This analysis also shows that 
B
1
B2
is determined by ac-
tual public spending allocation so that no general predictions regarding the
probability that any of the constraints is perceived as more binding than the
remaining one can be made.14
4.4 FirmsComparisons of Public Services and Public
Capital
This sub-section evaluates the policy implications of business perceptions of
the public spending-related constraints in relation to each other in Model 2
(one public service and one type of public capital). In this case, comparing
the perceptions of both types of constraints fails to correct the bias in busi-
ness perceptions. The intuition is that public capital is accumulated over
time and grows even in the absence of scal policy adjustments. By ignor-
ing the government budget constraint, rms do not take into account these
di¤erences.
To show this formally, we substitute for G1 and G2 in (31) using (7) and
(26):
B1
B2
=
1(1  1)
21
(34)
That is, compared to (32), in Model 2  is added to the denominator of
(34). In this model there is no closed-form solution of , so that (34) cannot
be evaluated analytically. However, using numerical examples, it can be
shown that in most instances, the policy preferences arising from business
perceptions in this case can be expected to be growth-reducing. Suppose for
instance 1 = 2 and 1 = 

1 = 0:5: Given that  < 1, it can be seen that in
this case, 
B
1
B2
> 1. This falsely suggests that the government should increase
1 further above its growth-maximizing value 

1. The Appendix provides
additional numerical examples with CES production technology that give
14Using numerical examples, the Appendix shows that these results continue to hold
when the elasticity of substitution between private and public inputs is smaller than in
the case of Cobb-Douglas technology.
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rise to the same result.
Using numerical examples, it is also possible to assess the probability that
rms perceive public services as a greater constraint than public capital and
vice versa by determining where in the scal policy space 1
2
> 1. The scal
policy space is dened in terms of all possible combinations of both scal
policy parameters,  and , within certain ranges. Figure 1 displays the
scal policy space for di¤erent exogenous parameter values. It is assumed
that 0:05  1  0:95 and that 0:05    0:94. The region where 
B
1
B2
< 1 is
shaded, whereas in the remainder of the policy space, 
B
1
B2
> 1. Probability
can be assessed in terms of the combinations of  and  where 
B
1
B2
> 1 and
B1
B2
< 1, respectively. The probability then corresponds to the share of the
policy space where 
B
1
B2
> 1 which has been approximated numerically for
each gure.15 In all cases, P (1
2
> 1) (i.e. the probability that rms perceive
public service-related constraints as more severe than public capital-related
constraints) is relatively high and signicantly greater than 0.5. This holds
even though the output elasticity of public capital, 2, is three times larger
than the output elasticity of public services, 1, in our simulation, but this
may not hold as 2.increases much further.16 While these numerical simu-
lations cannot be regarded as representative, they nevertheless demonstrate
that in many cases, it can be expected that 1
2
> 1 except for relatively high
values of 1.
Now suppose the opposite (and unlikely) case, namely that
B1
B2
< 1 (35)
implying that rms perceive G2 (public capital) as more binding than G1
15The area where 
B
1
B2
> 1 can be approximated by using the Trapezoidal Rule with an
interval length of 0:001 and then divided by the total area of the policy space.
16These measures of probability should be considered as a lower bound because the
location of the region where 
B
1
B2
< 1 is relatively distant from 1. When considering scal
policy changes around the growth-maximizing values, it is even more unlikely that 
B
1
B2
< 1
than the overall numerical measures suggest.
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Figure 1: Model 2 - 
B
1
B2
in the policy space
(public service). From (34), this implies that
1(1  1)
21
< 1 (36)
Rearranging (36) yields
1 >
1
1 + 2
(37)
In turn, if the RHS of (37) is larger than 1 so that
1
1 + 2
>
1
1 + 2
(38)
then 1 > 

1. Again, assuming that 0 <  < 1, then (38) is fullled.
In other words, when rms perceive that G2 (public capital) is a greater
constraint than G1 (public service), then the policy implications of business
perceptions of the public service-related constraint in terms of the public
capital-related constraint (namely to lower 1) are growth-enhancing. It
follows that when public services are ranked as a more severe constraint to
growth than public capital, then according to our model business perception
data are not a reliable guide to policy, whereas if public capital is identied
as the more severe constraint they are.
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4.5 FirmsComparisons of Taxes and Public Spending-
Related Constraints
This sub-section evaluates the policy implications of business perceptions of
the tax-related constraint in terms of the public spending-related constraints.
From (28) and (29), 
B

Bi
with i = 1; 2 can be written as
B
Bi
=
Gi
(1  )i (39)
This clearly illustrates the problem of comparing the perceptions of the tax-
related and the public services-related constraints: the comparison is es-
sentially between the growth e¤ects of an increase in the tax rate by one
percentage point with those resulting from an increase in Gi by one unit. As
we model the responses of rms in existing business surveys and have to take
the questionnaire design as given, normalizing the constraints and measuring
them on identical scales as done in Misch et al. (2010) and then asking rms
to assess their severity is desirable but not feasible for us.
In order to more rigorously evaluate the merits of this comparison, we
substitute for Gi using (7) according to which Gi = iy:
B
Bi
=
i
(1  )iy (40)
Suppose that the level of taxation is set at the growth-maximizing level
( =  ), but that the public resource allocation is suboptimal such that
i =
1
2
i . It is clear that in this case, raising i and keeping  constant
would be growth-enhancing. However, according to the business perception
B
Bi
> 1 (41)
if
y >
(1  )i
i
(42)
This condition is likely to hold true within endogenous growth models regard-
less of the composition of public spending and the level of taxation because y
(which constantly grows) is on the LHS. Therefore, the probability that tax
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rates are perceived as more binding than public spending-related constraints
(P ( 
1;2
> 1)) approaches one as time approaches innity irrespective of the
units of measurement of y. As a result, it is uncertain that 
B

Bi
provides the
correct(rst-best) policy prescriptions. Business perceptions of the appro-
priate policy response, to lower taxation, may match the rst-best policy
prescription, but rms support this policy response even when it is not op-
timal. Separating the occasions in which rm perceptions are correct and
when they are incorrect is not possible in this case; hence perception data
are not a reliable guide to policy when B > 
B
i .
Given that comparing the tax- and the public services-related constraints
to correct for the bias in business perceptions is not feasible due to di¤erences
in measurement, an obvious alternative would be to use business perceptions
to compute perceived growth elasticities with respect to  and Gi because
elasticities are unit-free. Using (29), (28), and (39) to compute the perceived
growth elasticities and dividing yields
B
Bi



Gi
=

(1  )i (43)
When the level of taxation is set at the growth-maximizing level ( =  ),
(43) can be rewritten as
1
(1  i) > 0 (44)
which is again greater than zero falsely suggesting that lowering taxation
raises the growth rate. The bias therefore remains even in case when per-
ceived elasticities are compared. This implies that the underlying source of
the bias is therefore primarily related to rms ignoring the government bud-
get constraint which cannot be corrected by considering business perceptions
relative to each other when the constraints are measured on di¤erent scales.
Now again suppose the opposite (and unlikely) case, namely that
B
Bi
< 1 (45)
so that
y <
(1  )i
i
(46)
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Rearranging (46) yields
 <
i
iy + i
(47)
In turn, if the RHS of (47) is smaller than   so that
i
iy + i
<   (48)
then  <  . Provided that   is not extremely small, (48) is likely to hold
if 
B

Bi
< 1. The reason is that the LHS of (48) is decreasing over time (since
y which grows indenitely is in the denominator). (48) together with (47)
then implies that  <   is likely. Rearranging (46) yields
i <
(1  )i
y
(49)
Again, provided that i is not extremely small, the RHS of (49) is likely
smaller than i since y, which grows over time, is in the denominator so that
(1  )i
y
< i (50)
Therefore, if 
B

Bi
< 1, i < 

i . In other words, the policy implications
of 
B

Bi
< 1 (i.e. rms perceive that Gi is a greater constraint than ) are
likely to be growth-enhancing in most cases. If public services are ranked
as a more severe constraint than taxation, the business perception of the
appropriate policy response is identical to the one suggested by a perfectly
informed government which maximizes growth. Business perception data
contain therefore useful information when B < 
B
i . All results presented
here also hold for Models 2 and 3.
4.6 Summary
Table 2 summarizes the assessment of business perceptions of di¤erent con-
straints in relative terms across all models and shows in which cases imper-
fectly informed governments may regard them as consistent with rst-best
advice. Perceptions-based rankings of similar types of constraints (i.e. di¤er-
ent public services or di¤erent types of public capital) give growth-enhancing
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policy suggestions, whereas perceptions-based rankings of di¤erent types of
constraints (tax-related constraints and public spending-related constraints,
or public service-related constraints and public capital-related constraints)
may give rise to growth-reducing policy suggestions depending on how rms
rank them.
The last column of Table 2 summarizes the key predictions regarding how
rms rank constraints. In summary, it is likely that rms perceive the tax-
related constraint as more binding than public service-related constraints,
which, in turn, are perceived as more binding than public capital-related
constraints (B > 
B
ps > 
B
pc). Firms perceive the tax rate as a more severe
constraint than public spending-related constraints because whereas public
services and public capital enter the expression of the growth rate (14) as
absolute values, the tax rate enters (14) as a relative value (i.e. from (2),
 = (g1 + g2)=y). The intuition to explain the prediction that rms perceive
public service-related constraints as more binding than public capital-related
constraints is that public capital grows over time so that the stock of public
capital will typically be larger than the ow of public services (i.e. G2 >
G1 in Model 2). With decreasing marginal returns and when G2 > G1, it
is therefore clear that Bps > 
B
pc. These biases arise because rms ignore
the government budget constraint. In contrast, no specic predictions can
be made about the relation between two public service-related constraints
and two public capital-related constraints. Table 2 shows, for example, that
the probability of rms falsely ranking tax constraints as a greater growth
constraint than public service or public capital constraints, is high. At the
same time, in the unlikely case that rms perceive public services or public
capital as a greater constraint than the tax rate, the policy implications of
the rmsranking are likely correct(i.e. growth-enhancing).
5 FirmsRanking of Constraints: Empirical
Observations
This section compares the theoretical predictions of how rms rank scal
policy-related constraints with the World Bank Enterprise Surveys to identify
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Table 2: Evaluation of business perceptions and model predictions with re-
spect to the ranking of constraints
Model Constraint i Constraint j Firms Policy impli- Ranking
ranking cation of probability
of i and j ranking
1,2 tax public service Bi > 
B
j possibly false* high
Bi < 
B
j correct** low
2,3 tax public capital Bi > 
B
j possibly false* high
Bi < 
B
j correct** low
1 public service public service Bi > 
B
j correct policy dependent
Bi < 
B
j correct policy dependent
2 public service public capital Bi > 
B
j possibly false*** high
Bi < 
B
j correct low
3 public capital public capital Bi > 
B
j correct policy dependent
Bi < 
B
j correct policy dependent
* assumes that (42) holds; ** assumes that (48)
and (50) hold; *** for most plausible numerical values
(Model 1: two public services; Model 2: one public service and one type of
public capital; Model 3: two types of public capital)
the extent to which these data contain information of use to policy makers.
This allows us to assess whether the systematic bias in the ranking of growth
constraints by the same rm appears to be present in the data. The WBES
dataset we use is based on cross-section, rm-level data that covers almost
94,000 rms in 148 countries that rate at least one of the relevant constraints.
Each of the countries included in the dataset was surveyed up to ve times
between 2002 and 2010 giving a total of 235 di¤erent surveys.17
The Enterprise Surveys provide a potentially useful testing ground against
which the model predictions with respect to the behavior of private agents can
be compared. The data includes a subjective rating of di¤erent scal policy-
related constraints: rm representatives were presented a list of obstacles
which they had to evaluate on a scale that ranges from 0 (no obstacle) to 4
(very severe obstacle). Some of the items in the list of obstacles are closely
related to scal policy. They include transportation, skills and education of
17The data was downloaded from www.enterprisesurveys.org on July 30th 2010.
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available workers, crime, theft and disorder, tax rates, and, to a lesser extent,
tax administration. Governments undertake public investment to built up
transportation infrastructure.18 Recurrent public spending to provide public
services in the education sector determines to a considerable extent the skills
and the education level of available workers19, and law enforcement by public
agencies (which likewise requires especially recurrent spending and only to
a lesser extent public investment) determines crime rates. The quality of
the tax administration depends to some extent on recurrent public spending,
but other factors are also likely to play an important role. In the models,
transportation infrastructure which requires relatively little recurrent spend-
ing and depreciates very slowly is represented by public capital. Education
services, law enforcement and to a lesser extent tax administration may be
represented by public services which both require a large share of recurrent
public spending. However, the WBES does not contain actual information
on deviations of scal policy from the growth-maximizing level of taxation,
public services and public capital. We turn to this issue at the end of this
section.
In general, there are several di¢ culties involved in the use of subjective
data including the reference point bias (i.e. respondents may use di¤erent
benchmarks against which obstacles are assessed), di¤erences in the over-
all tendencies to complain, and the performance bias (i.e. whether ratings
actually reect the rms performance in the environment rather than the
environment in which it operates) (Hallward-Driemeier and Aterido (2009)
and Clarke (2010)). We address these concerns by converting the subjective
rating of constraints into a ranking: the rating of the obstacles of every rm
is divided by the mean rating of all obstacles by the same rm.
The means of these ratios across all rms and countries are displayed in
18While in some countries, the government builds up electricity generation capacity
using public revenue, the role of the government is typically more that of a regulator,
and whether electricity is a major obstacle is to a larger extent determined by exogenous
shocks such as droughts than in the cases of the other obstacles. We therefore do not
consider electricity generation capacity as a scal-policy related obstacle.
19We assume that the evaluation of the skills of available workers includes an implicit
evaluation of public education services.
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Figure 2. As anticipated by the model it shows that transport is ranked lower
than constraints that require a relatively high share of recurrent spending in
order to be alleviated (education, crime and tax administration) which in
turn are ranked lower than tax rates. Note also that the three public service
categories are rated similarly.
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Figure 2: Mean business perception of scal policy-related obstacles
While the mean rankings suggest that taxation is usually ranked as the
most severe obstacle to growth of the six considered, of greater interest is the
distribution of mean rankings across countries. Figure 3 compares the av-
erage ranking of the ve scal policy-dependent constraints (transportation,
crime, education, tax administration and tax rates). It shows that in almost
60 percent of the countries, tax rates are ranked rst, and in over 50 percent
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of the countries, transport is ranked last.20 In contrast, there are only a few
surveys where tax rates are among the three least important obstacles, and
transportation is rarely ranked among the rst three obstacles. It can also
be seen that, as we would predict, there is no clear rank order between the
public service-related constraints: education, crime and tax administration.
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Figure 3: Ranking of scal policy-dependent constraints by country
Carlin et al. (2010) also report that tax rates are typically rated as
the most severe obstacle in most countries. Based on the endogenous growth
models considered above we anticipated that the tax-related constraint would
be perceived as more binding than the public service-related constraints
(crime and disorder, education and skills), which, in turn, would be per-
ceived as more binding than public capital-related constraints (transporta-
tion). Figures 2 and 3 show that on average, the observed patterns follow
these predictions, and it is likely that these patterns are not mainly driven
by actual scal policies but rather by a bias in the perception of rms. For
20For some countries, two or more Enterprise Surveys from di¤erent years are available.
Hence we use percentage of surveysrather than percentage of countries.
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these observations the model suggests that there is little reliable information
for policy makers. There are however a su¢ ciently large number of occasions
in which scal constraints are not in that order to suggest that there is some
information within the data. At the simplest level there are for example
40 percent of countries in which taxation is not ranked as the most severe
constraint. Indeed there are 104 occasions out of 235 in which one of the
remaining ve scal constraints is rated as more severe than taxation. Or
focusing on transportation which is closely related to the stock of public cap-
ital, there are 120 occasions out of 235 when this is not ranked as the least
important obstacle on growth. The model also suggests that the rankings
across di¤erent types of public service or di¤erent types of public capital are
informative.
Given that we are only able to assess the rms ranking based on the
model predictions but not based on objective data on deviations of actual
scal policy parameters from their growth-maximizing values, we cannot
fully rule out that the observed average ranking pattern is driven by the
actual severity of constraints. However, this seems unrealistic: on the one
hand, if one assumes for simplicity and in the absence of other information
that the severity of constraints is equally distributed across constraints (i.e.
that on average, the severity of each constraint is identical), such a ranking
would not emerge. On the other hand, many policy documents, for instance
by international development banks, routinely identify infrastructure as a
bottleneck to economic growth, or recommend increasing infrastructure in-
vestment. Assuming that on average, this analysis is correct, rms should
perceive transport infrastructure as a much more severe constraint if their
views were unbiased. However, this is not the case, which makes us condent
that our model-based conclusions are correct.
6 Conclusions
This paper has modelled business perceptions of alternative scal policy-
related growth constraints using an endogenous growth model with public
nance. It has then considered the merits of these perceptions as guides for
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policy making in practice, and compared the ranking of constraints by rms
in the World Banks Enterprise Surveys with the predictions of the model.
The models demonstrate that a carefuluse of business perceptions of dif-
ferent constraints relative to each other to identify growth-enhancing scal
policy reforms is possible. According to our framework, business perceptions
are not useful to infer the optimal level, the optimal composition and the
optimal magnitude of policy adjustments. However, it is the direction of the
policy change which is often most important for policy in practice due to
budget rigidities. In this case, business perceptions can provide some useful
information. The models examined suggest that rms may be expected to
be better at distinguishing the growth-enhancing or retarding e¤ects of sim-
ilar public spending categories (di¤erent public services or di¤erent types of
public capital). However, the models demonstrate that business perceptions
may be misleading when rms are asked to compare taxes, public services
and public capital with each other in the sense that there is no certainty
that the scal policy prescriptions they imply are growth-enhancing in the
long run. One exception is that the policy implications from the comparison
of di¤erent aspects of scal policy are likely to be growth-enhancing when
they are ranked contrary to the general prediction that taxes are ranked as
a more severe constraint than public expenditures, and that public services
are likely to be ranked as more severe than public capital.
The theoretical predictions regarding how rms are most likely to rank
scal policy-related constraints correspond fairly well to empirical observa-
tions. While we do not observe the actual ranking of constraints and are
therefore unable to compare this to the perceived ranking, we argue that it is
likely that the overall pattern we observe is driven by the biases we identify
in our models. When constraints are ranked according to the predictions of
the model, business perceptions are not reliable for policy analysis. However
there are a su¢ ciently large number of observations for which the model
suggests that business perceptions are a useful guide. Therefore, this has
been a worthwhile exercise, and our analysis does not suggest that business
perceptions never contain useful information.
The results of this paper may also help to interpret ndings of empiri-
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cal papers that use business perception data as explanatory variables. For
instance, Balchin and Edwards (2008) nd that business perceptions of in-
frastructure are mostly not a signicant determinants of export participation
even though they nd that objective infrastructure indicators are to some ex-
tent signicant. The results of this paper suggest that these ndings are not
surprising because on average and in comparisons to other constraints, rms
do not perceive infrastructure as an important obstacle irrespective of the
actual state of the infrastructure.
The results here also suggest possible options for the re-design of invest-
ment climate surveys. In particular, they suggest that the rmsranking of
tax-related constraints may be exaggerated. In addition, they suggest that
it would be useful to ask rms to compare di¤erent types of public capital,
and, in a separate question, to ask rms to compare di¤erent types of public
services. This would provide rms with a more rened list of obstacles, and
make their resulting comparisons more meaningful.
Our results only hold within the standard modelling framework we use
and the assumptions it is based on. One implication of this framework is that
rms in fact do not learn from past mistakes and revise their perceptions ac-
cordingly. This is likely to correspond to rm behavior in practice because
this would require rms to systematically record their perceptions and scal
policy changes and compare them to their own growth and investment be-
havior. However, rms are unlikely to do this because learning would entail
cost but no benets in terms of better rm performance.
While we recognize that alternative frameworks to interpret business per-
ceptions data may be available, we believe our results suggest that endoge-
nous growth models with public nance are a natural frameworkto provide
rst steps to understand the value of perception data. Establishing the ro-
bustness of those conclusions to alternative frameworks is an obvious next
step. The models examined here, and compared with business perceptions,
are limited to relatively simple public service/capital distinctions and the
channels by which they impact on growth. Possible extensions could for
instance include adding further channels that a¤ect the growth-maximizing
scal policy.
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We have shown that business perceptions in absolute terms do not contain
useful information for governments. However, we have compared the rating of
di¤erent constraints by a single rm and have shown that such a ranking may
be useful for governments. Future research could therefore usefully discuss
other types of comparisons. For instance, our framework could be used to
compare the rating of the same constraint across rms in di¤erent sectors or
countries more in the spirit of Carlin et al. (2010). This would require models
with at least two sectors of production that are a¤ected by productive public
services as in Monteiro and Turnovsky (2008). A nal extension would be
to include other types of business perceptions in the discussion which would
require a more complex modelling framework.
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A Appendix
A.1 The Models with CES technology
With CES technology, the production function is
y = (k + 1G

1 + 2G

2)
1
 (A.1)
where , 1 and 2 are share parameters with  = 1 1 2. The elasticity
of substitution, s, is determined by :
s =
1
1   (A.2)
With  = 0, the production technology is Cobb-Douglas. To capture the
notion that factors of production are complements rather than substitutes,
it is assumed that   0.
A.2 Uniqueness and Stability in Model 2 with CES
Technology
Let x = c
k
and z = G2
k
. Together with the transversality condition, lim
t!1
[k] =
0, and with the initial conditions, x0 > 0 and z0 > 0, the dynamics of the
market economy can be expressed as a system of two di¤erential equations:
_x
x
=
_c
c
 
_k
k
(A.3)
and
_z
z
=
_G2
G2
 
_k
k
(A.4)
From (12), (5) and (9), respectively,
_c
c
=
1

((1  )yk   ) (A.5)
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_k
k
= (1  )y
k
  x (A.6)
_G2
G2
= 2
y
G2
(A.7)
Setting _x
x
= 0 in (A.3) and solving for x yields its steady state value, ~x:
~x = (1  )y
k
  1

((1  )yk   ) (A.8)
Using (A.8) to substitute for x in (A.6), and using (A.6) and (A.7) to sub-
stitute for ( _k
k
) and ( _G2
G2
) in (A.4) yields
F = 2
y
G2
  1

(1  )yk + 

(A.9)
where F is a function. From (8) and (23),
G1
G2
=
1
2
 (A.10)
From (A.1) and (A.10),
y
G2
= (z  + 1

1
2


+ 2)
1
 (A.11)
Di¤erentiating (A.1) for k, using (8) to substitute for G1 and replacing G2k
by z yields
yk =

 + 1

1
y
k

+ 2z

 1

 1
 (A.12)
From (1) and (8),
y
k
=

 + 2z

(1  11)
 1

(A.13)
After using (A.13) to substitute in (A.12), and (A.11) and (A.12) to sub-
stitute in (A.9), it can be seen that if   0, dF
dz
< 0 implying that F is
a monotonically decreasing function of z so that there is a unique positive
value of ~z that satises F = 0. From (A.8), there is a unique positive value
of ~x as well. Thus, the growth path is unique.
To investigate the dynamics in the vicinity of the unique steady state
equilibrium, equations (A.3) and (A.4) can be linearized to yield
_x
_z

=

a11 a12
a21 a22
 
x  ~x
z   ~z

(A.14)
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where ~x and ~z denote the steady state values of x and z. From (A.3) and
(A.4), _x and _z can be rewritten as follows:
_x =
 
_c
c
 
_k
k
!
~x (A.15)
and
_z =
 
_G2
G2
 
_k
k
!
~z (A.16)
with _c
c
, _k
k
and _G2
G2
dened according to (A.5), (A.6) and (A.7). Saddlepoint
stability requires that the determinant of the Jacobian matrix of partial deriv-
atives of the dynamic system (A.14) must be negative:
det J = a11a22   a12a21 (A.17)
Given the complexity of the matrix, it is easier to verify numerically that
this condition holds. For most sensible examples with sensible parameter
values that we used, this condition is satised.
A.3 Uniqueness and Stability in Model 3 with CES
Technology
With x = c
k
, z = G2
k
and w = G1
G2
, the dynamics of the market economy can
be expressed as a system of three di¤erential equations:
_x
x
=
_c
c
 
_k
k
(A.18)
_z
z
=
_G2
G2
 
_k
k
(A.19)
_w
w
=
_G1
G1
 
_G2
G2
(A.20)
From (26), w can be written as
w =
1
2
(A.21)
Therefore, as long as 1;2 are constant, _w = 0 and
_w
w
= 0. This means that
in terms of its dynamic properties, Model 3 is identical to Model 2, and it
can be shown in the same way as for Model 2 that Model 3 has likewise a
unique and saddlepath stable steady state equilibrium.
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Figure 4: Models 1 and 3 - 
B
1
B2
as a function of 1
A.4 Business Perceptions of Public Spending-Related
Constraints with CES Technology
When the elasticity of substitution is smaller than in the case of Cobb-
Douglas technology ( < 0), there are mostly no closed-form solutions of
the the growth-maximizing policies,   and . Therefore, this appendix
evaluates the policy implications of 
B
1
B2
in Models 1, 2 and 3 using numerical
examples. Figure A.1 which refers to both, Models 1 and 3, conrms that
with  < 0, the policy implications of 
B
1
B2
are growth-enhancing when poli-
cies are not set at the growth maximum. In contrast, Figure A.2 provides a
numerical example with CES technology which shows that business percep-
tions of the public service- and public capital-related constraints in relation
to each other may be misleading (Model 2). Consider the case where 1 > 

1.
Figure A.2 shows that in this case, it is possible that 
B
1
B2
> 1 which suggests
increasing 1 even further.
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Figure 5: Model 2 - 
B
1
B2
as a function of 1
A.5 The Ranking Probabilities of Public Service- and
Public Capital-Related Constraints with CES Tech-
nology
This appendix presents numerical examples to derive the probability that
B1 > 
B
2 in Model 2 (the probability that rms perceive public services as
a greater constraint than public capital) in analogy to Figure 1. In Figure
A.3, the production technology is CES (with  =  1) which requires that
  0:3 in order that output is positive. It shows that the probability that
B1 > 
B
2 (denoted by P ) is likewise very high.
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Figure 6: Model 2 - 
B
1
B2
in the policy space
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